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PRACTICE OF LAW
The Supreme Court of Georgia in an opinion recently
handed down has enlarged the practice of law to include
"conveyancing; the preparation of all legal instruments of all
kinds whereby a legal right is secured; the rendering of
opinions as to the validity or invalidity of the title to real or
personal property; the giving of any legal advice; and any
action taken for others in any matters connected with the law."
COLLECTING AGENCIES ABUSE
The Supreme Court of Tennessee recently enjoined the
Retail Credit Men's Association from unlawfully practicing
law. The Association was organized under the Statute of
Tennessee providing for "the organization of corporations for
the purpose of conducting commercial, mercantile and pro-
tective agencies for the purpose of collecting debts." The
agency received claims for collection and when letters failed,
the attorney employed by them upon a salary, instituted suit.
In cases where suits upon notes were involved the Association
appropriated the attorney's fees as well.
More particularly the decree contained the following
injunctive relief :
(a) Soliciting claims for collection with the understand-
ing with its clients that suit will be instituted by it and collec-
tion enforced by legal procedure.
(b) Employing a licensed attorney to give legal advice
to clients.
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(c) Employing a licensed attorney to bring suit at law
and equity and thus evade the law respecting admission to
the Bar.
(d) Collecting attorney's fees on notes.
In entering the decree the Court stated in effect, that the
attorney must represent the client and not the association; the
merchant must become a client of the lawyer; the agent, a
corporation, is incapacitated from beginning or directing a
lawsuit for others either through a law employee or through
a member of the Bar.
It has been stated that too often the collection agency is
used as an adjunct to a general law office and as a cloak for
solicitation of law business.
Guy a Thompson, President of the American Bar Asso-
ciation, addressing the Detroit Bar Association recently,
stated, "The relation of lawyer and client is a sacred one. It
knows no divided allegiance. The public welfare requires the
maintenance of that relation in all its traditional purity and
integrity. No man can serve two masters."
LEGAL APPRENTICESHIP
Dean A. J. Harno of College of Law, University of
Illinois, is credited with conceiving a plan of helping law
students acquire practical knowledge of law during the sum-
mer by spending their time in a law office. The Illinois Bar
Association cooperated and through the generous response of
Illinois lawyers the plan was tried out with apparent success
and thereby invaluable experience gained by the student.
HABITUAL CRIMINAL ACT
The New York legislature has passed two acts to amend
the fourth offender clause of the Baumes Law. The bills await
the governor's signature. Practical experience has shown that
the small offender, who is no serious menace, has suffered
while the criminal against whom the act was directed, has
entirely escaped the harsh effects of the act. As stated by one
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writer it "prevents the judges from using common sense, it
assumes all things to be equal, which are not."
THE PUBLIC AND THE BAR
The Minnesota Bar Association is sponsoring weekly
broadcasts to acquaint the public with the service rendered
the community by the legal profession. Favorable comments
upon these broadcasts have been received generally. The
Board of Governors of the State Bar of California recently
appointed a statewide committee of fifteen to inform the public
concerning the function of the legal profession and to main-
tain and increase the respect of the public for the Bar.
BANKRUPTCY REFORM
President Herbert Hoover recently recommended to the
Senate and House of Representatives as follows:
"The bankruptcy act should be amended to provide re-
medial processes in voluntary proceeding under which debtors
unable to pay their debts in due course, may have the protec-
tion of the Court without being adjudged bankrupt, for the
purpose of composing or extending maturity of their debts,
of amortizing the payment of their debts out of future earn-
ings, of procuring the liquidation of their property under
voluntary assignment to a trustee; or, in the case of corpora-
tions for the purpose of reorganizations."
An amendment containing the above purport should be
beneficial to both creditors and debtors.
BAR REPORTS WANTED
The Supreme Court Library has a complete set of the Bar Association
Reports of this State. It is attempting as far as possible to complete sets of
other States. In many cases copies can only be obtained by exchange. Mem-
bers of the Colorado Bar having copies of our Bar Association Reports with
which they are willing to part, will confer a favor on the library and the
Profession by sending their copies to or communicating with the Supreme
Court Librarian at the Capitol.
IN THE MATTER OF EX PARTE RESTRAIN-
ING ORDERS, INJUNCTIONS AND WRITS
OF NE EXEAT IN DIVORCE CASES
By George F. Dunklee, Presiding Judge, District Court
HEN I became presiding judge on January 12, 1932,WI was struck by an unusually large number of ex parte
applications for restraining orders and writs of ne
exeat in divorce cases.
The first one issued was ex parte upon application based
on allegations of the complaint and an affidavit. The next
morning the defendant appeared and showed that he was living
at home, regularly employed, and it was plain there was no
justification for the plaintiff asking such extraordinary relief.
Plaintiff's attorney consented that the order be set aside.
Applications for similar orders were made frequently and
I took a stand not to issue them on affidavits alone and re-
quired the plaintiff to come into court, take the stand and
testify. In practically all cases the court was satisfied, from
the evidence, that there was no necessity for any such order.
I had the Clerk make a search of the records for the
purpose of ascertaining about how many ex parte restraining
orders and writs of ne exeat had been issued in the past seven
years and found that in: 1925, 77; 1926, 88; 1927, 98; 1928,
132; 1929, 118; 1930, 104; 1931, 67; 1932, 3, since January
12th to date, April 9th, including one set aside as above stated.
I looked up the authorities, first, as to the authority of
the courts to issue such ex parte orders; and second, as to the
public policy of the court issuing them without notice ex parte.
It is elementary civil code practice law that, "Every
direction of the court or judge, made or entered in writing,
and not included in a judgment, is denominated an order.
An application for an order is a motion." (Sec. 406, C. Code,
C. L. 1921.)
"Written notice of motions shall be required in all cases, except those
made during the progress of the trial." (Sec. 407 Civil Code, C. L. 1921.)
That brings us to a question of an exception to the above
provisions of the Code, if any, or of the inherent common-law
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power of the court, if any, in such cases, to disregard the
giving of notice and bond.
The case of Sedgwick v. Sedgwick, 50 Colo. 167, deals
with temporary injunctions and restraining orders without
notice, and on pages 167 and 168 the court says (quoting from
Sec. 165 of the Code, C. L. 1921):
"In the event the temporary restraining order shall issue without notice
and it shall afterwards appear to the court, upon any hearing or trial of said
matter, that the emergency alleged therefor did not exist, or, existing, was
brought about by the act or omission of or for the plaintiff, or by his knowl-
edge, the court shall find and enter judgment accordingly, and shall, also,
dismiss the complaint without respect to the merits thereof, and shall, also,
summarily enter judgment on said emergency bond for the defendant and
against the plaintiff and his sureties aforesaid, and issue execution therefor."
Page 168:
"It is claimed under this statute, the trial court erred in not dismissing
the complaint. The claim is wrong, for the simple reason counsel did not ask
to have it dismissed. If counsel wanted the action dismissed upon a hearing
of 'said matter,' they should have called it to the attention of the court and
had it heard. 'Said matter,' does not refer to the principal suit, but to the
issuing of the restraining order. This not to be construed as implying that
the code provision on injunction is applicable to divorce actions. Whether
the district court possesses inherent common-law power to issue restraining
orders in proper cases, in divorce actions, without notice and without bond,
we express no opinion."
At least that decision leaves the legal propriety of issuing
such orders in doubt.
In the case of In re Nash, 62 Colo. 101, on the question
of "ne exeat," it says among other things:
"Scope of the Writ, has not been enlarged by the code," etc.
A practice and custom has been built up by plaintiff
coming into court ex parte with stock allegations in complaints
and affidavits and getting these extraordinary orders as a mat-
ter of course in cases where the husband and wife are at the
time of the filing of the suit living together in the same house,
and the fact of the issuance of these extraordinary and harsh
orders brings about a condition between the husband and wife
whereby there can be no reconciliation.
I am of the opinion that ex parte injunction orders not
issued if at all without notice, until the Supreme Court holds
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otherwise, except the court upon an examination of the plain-
tiff, not on affidavit or complaint alone, is convinced of a
critical condition which would call for the extraordinary
powers of the court to protect the plaintiff.
Among the authorities I cite the following:
"Since it is ex parte, and it is 'a remedy of great severity, it is applied
to private rights with great caution and jealousy,' and will not ordinarily be
granted when the equity is doubtful, nor as a means of improper restraint."
2 Story Equity Practice, p. 801 ; also 45 C. J. 590.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF COLORADO
N order that the Supreme Court may expedite its work, it
has been divided into three departments instead of two,
pursuant to the authority of the Constitution. This means
that the Chief Justice and two associates constitute a depart-
ment. Such was the practice until a few years ago, but after-
wards two departments were established. Of course should
any member of a department disagree with his associates, then
the case is considered by the court en banc. Cases involving
constitutional questions and capital cases are heard by the
court en banc, as well as other cases when so directed by the
court.
The three departments as announced by the court Monday
are constituted as follows:
Department One:
Mr. Chief Justice Adams Mr. Justice Campbell
Mr. Justice Alter
Department Two:
Mr. Chief Justice Adams Mr. Justice Butler
Mr. Justice Moore
Department Three:




By Carlos G. Stratton, of the Denver Bar
66 ITHY should I register a trade-mark in both the United
States and in the state? Doesn't the United States
registration include the state?" is a question often
encountered in trade-mark practice.
The answer is that both are advisable, for at least two very
definite reasons. First, the United States registration is not
infringed by competing use that is wholly intrastate. Con-
gress passed a trade-mark act in 1870 that was declared un-
constitutional by the Supreme Court in 1879, because the act
permitted registration of any trade-mark. The Trade-Mark
Act of 1905, the earliest of two Federal trade-mark acts that
are now in force, only allows registration of trade-marks that
have been in use in interstate commerce, and it has been held
that the only uses of a trade-mark that will constitute infringe-
ment of the Federal registration is interstate use.' In other
words, use of the trade-mark Coca-Cola, for instance, would
not be an infringement of the United States registration, if
the use is confined wholly within the State of Colorado.
The second reason why state registration is advisable in
addition to national registration is that there is a criminal
statute in most, if not all, states for criminal prosecution of
an infringer of a state registered mark. Colorado has such a
criminal statute. The only penalties for infringing a na-
tionally registered trade-mark are civil, to wit, injunction and
damages.4
An important feature of the state statute is the variety of
things that can be registered, to wit: labels, trade-marks, terms,
designs, devices or forms of advertisement.'
A trade-mark does not need to be used on goods in order
to be registrable in this state, since according to Sec. 4021
"adoption" is enough by itself, but there must be actual use
on the goods in interstate commerce before registration can
2 Youngs Rubber Corp. v. C. 1. Lee & Co., 45 F. (2d) 103, 106.
3 See. 4020, Comp. Laws of Colo., 1921.
4 Act of Feb. 20, 1905, Sec. 16.
5 Sec. 4020, Comp. Laws of Colo., 1921.
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be secured in the United States. Under "Form of Advertise-
ment" the office of the Secretary of State of Colorado has
registered slogans, such as "Packed in the Shadow of the
Rockies," for the Kuner Pickle Co.
Thus, if the owner of a trade-mark wants to stop infringe-
ment that is carried on wholly within the State of Colorado
and/or to be able to criminally prosecute an infringer, the
state registration is important. The national registration is,
of course, advisable in order to prevent interstate commerce
and to make a public record in Washington of the ownership
of the trade-mark in question.
As a matter of information, a Federal registration under
the Act of 1905 is good for twenty years and may be renewed
perpetually, providing it is renewed within six months before
each period expires.' There is no term limit on registrations
under the Act of 1920. The statutes of Colorado do not name
any limit of time for a registration of a state registered trade-
mark.
A trade-mark may be registered in the United States
Patent Office, not only if it has been used on goods in interstate
commerce, but also if it has been in use in commerce with an
Indian tribe, or in commerce with someone in a foreign
country.
There are two trade-mark acts under which the United
States Patent Office now registers trade-marks, the Acts of
February 20, 1905, and March 19, 1920. Apparently all
marks that are registrable under the Act of 1905 may be regis-
tered under the Act of 1920, but only restricted groups of
marks may be registered under the Act of 1905. The logical
question then would be, "Well, why use the Act of 1905 at all
then?" The answer is that attorneys want to register under
the Act of 1905, if possible, because registration under the
Act of 1905 means that the registrant is prima facie the owner
of the trade-mark. If registration under the Act of 1905 is
not possible, then registration under the Act of 1920 is re-
sorted to. Registration under the Act of 1920 does not mean
that the registrant is the owner. The effect of registration
under the latter act is to officially recognize the date that the
registrant claims to have started using the trade-mark.
o Sec. 12 of the Trade-Mark Act of Feb. 20, 1905.
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The only excuse for Congress ever having passed such a
trade-mark act as that of 1920 apparently was to provide means
for registering descriptive, geographic and other marks not
registrable under the Act of 1905, on account of the Inter-
national Convention for the Protection of Industrial Prop-
erty, to which the United States is an adherent. A number
of countries of the world require that before a foreigner may
register a trade-mark, he must have registered the mark in
his own country. If a citizen of the United States happened
to be using a descriptive mark or a geographic mark, and
wanted to register it in one or more of those countries, he
could not do so because he could not register the mark in the
United States under the Act of 1905. Furthermore, certain
foreign countries allowed our citizens to register descriptive
and geographic trade-marks in their countries and demanded
the same right for their citizens in the United States, hence
the trade-mark Act of 1920. It is necessary to understand this
background for this act in order to appreciate why we have
two trade-mark acts, whose effects are so dissimilar and yet
which overlap some as to what is registerable under each.
An interesting decision as to what is geographic was
decided in 1931 by the U. S. Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, in which it held that the word "Plymouth" used by
the Chrysler Motors for the name of an automobile was not
"merely geographic," which the Act of 1905 prohibits as non-
registrable. In this decision, the court stated on this point:
"But it is well settled, we think, that a geographic name,
or term, may acquire such a secondary meaning as to remove
it from the 'generic or descriptive' designation which renders
it incapable of individual appropriation, and make it subject
to rights, which equity will, within proper limits, protect. In
other words, a geographic name can, and frequently does, ac-
quire a meaning which causes it to become something other
than merely geographic, or solely geographic, or only geo-
graphic."
In re Plymouth Motor Corp., 46 F. (2d) 211.
Another difference between the Act of 1905 and the Act
of 1920 is that the trade-mark must have been used for one
year in interstate commerce by the applicant before it can be
registered under the Act of 1920, but a single use is sufficient
for registration under the Act of 1905. In other words, if a
client wishes to register a descriptive or geographic mark, it
must be used in interstate commerce for at least one year before
it can be registered.
The proceeding to obtain registration under the Act of
1905 will probably be of interest. The application first must
meet with the approval of the Examiner as to form. Details
of the requirements as to form will not be related here, but
suffice to say the requirements are rigid, as with most govern-
mental agencies.
After the application has been approved as to form, the
trade-mark is published in the Official Gazette of the Patent
Office, and anyone who thinks he will be damaged by the
registration may oppose same within thirty days after publi-
cation.7
Generally speaking, however, the only one who is able
to successfully oppose registration of a trade-mark is one who
has used the same or a deceptively similar mark for a longer
period on goods having the same descriptive properties. If
the opposer is successful, of course, the mark is not registered.
If the applicant prevails against the opposer, or if the regis-
tration is not opposed, the certificate of registration is issued
in due course of business.
"How long does it take to register a trade-mark?" is often
asked. If no opposition is filed and there is no appeal, it
generally takes from three to four months to register under
the Act of 1905. It is usually from one to two months shorter
under the Act of 1920, because registration of a mark under
this act may not be opposed.
"If someone who has used the mark for a shorter period,
should register the mark first, what is the remedy?" The man
who has used a trade-mark longest is the one who is entitled
to the registration. The United States statutes do not recog-
nize territorial rights when it comes to registration of trade-
marks, so the first user is entitled to the registration even
though the second user adopted and is using the mark in good
faith, not knowing of the first user. In this connection, it
might be explained, however, that under the well recognized
doctrine of territorial rights, the subsequent adopter may
7 Sec. 6, of the Act of Feb. 20, 1905.
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continue to use his mark in his territority, providing his adop-
tion and use of the mark was in good faith and not inimical to
the rights of the other party.'
If the one who had used the trade-mark a shorter period
had registered the mark without the longer utser opposing it,
the latter nevertheless has the remedy of cancelling the regis-
tration of the later user. This is the answer to the question
as to what happens where someone slips in and registers the
trade-mark.
In view of the fact that a proceeding is provided for
opposing the registration of the mark, the argument has been
made that the earliest user is estopped from later on asserting
that he is a prior user of the mark because he did not oppose
the registration or that the prior user is guilty of laches in
not bringing the cancellation proceeding as soon as the mark
is registered. However, the doctrine of laches has been held
not to apply to the bringing of a cancellation proceeding be-
cause the statute says it can be brought "at any time. '
A line of cases about trade-mark registration that may
be surprising to the attorney in general practice holds that
"registration under the statute confers no new rights to the
mark claimed or any greater rights than already exist at com-
mon law without registration." Registration, however, fa-
cilitates the remedy when suit is brought for infringement of
the trade-mark. In other words, the owner of a trade-mark
does not obtain any new rights by registration. He has, how-
ever, the official stamp of approval on the rights he already
has and in case of suit his registration certificate is prima facie
evidence that he is the owner. Another thing is that after
registration in the United States Patent Office, notice of such
may be given the public generally, as by affixing "Registered
in U. S. Patent Office" or "Reg. U. S. Pat. Off." on the mark;
in fact, notice must be given in order for the registrant to
obtain damages in a suit for infringement under the Federal
trade-mark statutes.
s Hanovier Star Milling Co. v,. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403; and United Drug Co. vi.
Rectanus Co., 248 U. S. 90.
9 Sec. 13, of the Act of 1905.
20 Nims on Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks, p. 592.
CROSS EXAMINATION UNDER THE
STATUTE
By Charles Rosenbaum, of the Denver Bar
ECTION 376 of the Colorado Code provides that the
testimony of a party to the action or proceeding or a
person for whose immediate benefit the action or pro-
ceeding is prosecuted or defended, may be taken at any time
after the service of summons or the appearance of the de-
fendant. This provision of the Code has been in force since
1887.
In 1899, Section 6570 of the 1921 Compiled Laws was
passed. It provides in substance that in a civil action a party
to the record for whose immediate benefit the action or pro-
ceeding is prosecuted or defended, or the directors, officers,
superintendent or managing agent of any corporation which
is a party to the record, MAY BE EXAMINED UPON
THE TRIAL THEREOF, as if under cross-examination, at
the instance of the adverse party. The Section further goes
on to provide that the party calling for such examination is
not concluded thereby but may rebut it by counter-testimony.
It will be noted that under the Code, the time when the
deposition may be taken is fixed "at any time after the service
of the summons or the appearance of the defendant", while
under the cross-examination statute it is stated that the adverse
party "may be examined upon the trial thereof". A number
of states, including Arizona, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois,
Massachusetts, North Dakota, New Hampshire, Ohio, Penn-
sylvania, Vermont, Wisconsin and Tennessee, have similar
statutes permitting the adverse party to be called as a witness
in the same manner as other witnesses. Most statutes provide
that the adverse party shall be compelled to testify "as a wit-
ness at the trial or by deposition", while others provide that
the examination shall be subject to the rules applicable to the
examination of other witnesses. Because of the limited time,
it is impossible to discuss the decisions in some of these states.
Most of them, however, have been considered by the various
District Judges before whom the question has been argued.
The first case in this district, of which I have been able
to find any definite record, involving the right to take deposi-
tions before trial as under cross-examination, arose in 1915.
(Whitt v. Orchard Products Co.). Judge Denison, then sit-
ting as District Judge, held that the deposition of the adverse
party could be taken before trial as under cross-examination.
The question again arose in 1919 (Davis v. Robinson, No.
68054) in a case where the plaintiff, through Edgar McComb
as his counsel, sought to take defendant's deposition as under
cross-examination before trial. The defendant, represented by
N. Walter Dixon, refused to appear for cross-examination
upon the advice of counsel. Judge Hersey, in a lengthy opin-
ion, agreed with Judge Denison, and held the defendant guilty
of contempt. He reasoned as follows: First, that under the
common law, disregarding the statute, one had the right to
cross-examine an adverse or hostile witness (40 Cyc. 2159;
120 N. W. 264) and Since the deposition could be taken before
trial under the Code, such deposition might properly be taken
as under cross-examination. Those taking the other side of
the question argue that the foregoing reasoning does not apply
because the cross-examination statute was passed after the
Code provision and the later statute should therefore govern,
in determining the intention of the legislature. This argument
may be answered by calling attention to the Decision of our
Supreme Court in Purse v. Purcell, 43 Colo. 50 at 53, which
holds that our cross-examination statute does not abridge any
right which a party had at common law. Judge Hersey held,
second, that the cross-examination statute was remedial in
character and therefore was entitled to a liberal construction
for the purpose of accomplishing the object sought to be ob-
tained thereby. Third, that under the common law (40 Cyc.
2473) and under the Code, the time at which a party might
examine his adversary was within the discretion of the trial
Court.
In 1926 the question again arose before Judge Butler,
sitting as District Judge in the case of Lednum v. Lednum
(No. 90503). In that case Judge Butler in a written opinion,
after having read Judge Hersey's opinion, stated that although
he entertained a very high regard for Judge Hersey he could
not agree with him and that the words "upon the trial", meant
upon the trial and not before the trial and that any other con-
struction was not liberal but was doing violence to the plain
DICTA 199
DICTA
language of the statute. There are numerous decisions which
hold that the proceedings, motions, arguments and pleadings
prior to the taking of evidence in Court are no part of a trial
in its generally accepted meaning. (Lipscomb v. State, 76
Miss. 253; Hunnell v. State, 86 Ind. 431 ; State v. Hazledahl,
2 N. Dak. 521; Wagner v. State, 42 Ohio State 537; Ward v.
Territory, 8 Okla. 25. See also "Trial", Webster's New In-
ternat. Dictionary, 1918).
Judge Butler went on to state, however, that in his opin-
ion the importance of the cross-examination statute has been
over-estimated for the reason that under the Code the adverse
party could be subpoenaed and examined as a hostile or ad-
verse witness. This right, in his opinion, included practically
all the benefits to be gained by the cross-examination statute.
He goes on to point out that the only fundamental difference
between the examination of an adverse witness and the cross-
examination of a witness under the statute is that in the former
case evidence might not be permitted attacking the general
reputation of the adverse party for truth and veracity, whereas
under the statute the party calling his opponent for cross-
examination would not be precluded from attacking his gen-
eral reputation. In other respects the party calling the ad-
verse party would not be concluded or bound by his testimony
but could call other witnesses to contradict him. (Brown v.
Tourtelotte, 24 Colo. at 216; C. B. & Q. R. R. v. Roberts, 35
Colo. 501; Pacific Life Co. v. Van Fleet, 47 Colo.-at 405).
From a practical standpoint, if information is all that is
desired by the deposition and the party taking the deposition
does not desire to be bound, even to the extent of being pre-
cluded from introducing testimony attacking the general repu-
tation of the adverse party, he may proceed to take the depo-
sition and need not introduce it in evidence, in which event
he is not bound by the deposition.
Upon inquiry I am advised that three District Judges
outside of our own District, have taken the position that the
deposition can be taken before trial as under cross-examina-
tion. In our own District, viz. Denver, all of the District
Judges have ruled on the proposition except Judge Steele.
With the exception of Judge Holland, they have followed
Judge Butler's decision in the Lednum case and have refused
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to permit the depositions to be taken as under cross-examina-
tion. Judge Holland, on the other hand, agreeing with Judges
Denison and Hersey before him, has permitted the taking of
the deposition as under cross-examination, and in addition to
the reasoning expounded by Judge Hersey, takes the position
that the purpose of both the Code and the Statute is to permit
the adverse party to get the facts before trial and that he
should be given every opportunity to do so. He says that if
the witness called is forced to divulge any fact that the other
party is entitled to, justice has been done and the intention
of the Legislature carried out. He takes the position that in
his opinion it was not the intention of the Legislature by the
statute to handicap the party desiring to take the deposition,
even to the extent of being unable to impeach the general repu-
tation of his adversary.
In connection with the cross-examination statute an in-
teresting question arose sometime ago before Judge Sackmann,
in a suit involving fraud, in which exemplary damages was
asked. (Hart v. Hammond). It involved the right, upon
the trial, to call the defendant for cross-examination under the
statute. There is authority to the effect that the privilege
of a witness not to furnish evidence which might incriminate
him, is not limited merely to a criminal proceeding but that
it can be invoked in a civil proceeding in which a penalty
(based on a non-remedial statute) is asked, or where the testi-
mony of the witness might tend to prove an offense punishable
as a crime.
A number of decisions have held that where the purpose
of a suit is to recover a penalty, the defendant cannot be com-
pelled to testify. (29 L. R. A. 811). In Counselman v. Hitch-
cock, 142 U. S. 547 at 563, the Supreme Court of the United
States says:
"It is an ancient principle of the law of evidence, that a witness shall not
be compelled in any proceedings to make disclosures or to give evidence which
will tend to criminate him, or subject him to fines, penalties or forfeitures."
Both the Supreme Court of the United States and our
own Supreme Court have stated that the object of the con-
stitutional provision was not merely for the protection of the
individual in a criminal prosecution against himself, but its
purpose was to insure that a person could not be required
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when acting as a witness in any investigation, to give testi-
mony which might tend to show that he himself had com-
mitted a crime. (Tuttle v. People, 33 Colo. 243 at 254).
Our Supreme Court, as you know, has held that exem-
plary damages are penal in character. (French v. Dean, 19
Colo. 504; Ristine v. Blocker, 15 Colo. App. 224 at 230).
Judge Sackmann accordingly held that since the answers
of the defendant called for cross-examination, might subject
him to a penalty, viz. exemplary damages, such defendant
could not be compelled to testify. This same reasoning would,
of course, apply in a suit in which fraud or similar facts, con-
stituting a crime are sought to be elicited.
There is some question whether a dicta of our Supreme
Court in Radinsky v. People, 66 Colo. 179 at 183, does not
indicate a contrary view.
In that case plaintiff refused to testify before the grand
jurv because it might prejudice his interests in an election
contest. Our Supreme Court said:
"One is not relieved of the duty to testify in preliminary examinations,
or before grand juries, or in criminal cases, merely because such testimony may
have a tendency to influence claims made by him in civil actions. (Citing
Cases).
"Furthermore, under our statute, his adversary may require him to
answer, as upon cross-examination, in such actions."
Since preparing these remarks, I have been advised that
the first question discussed by me is now being taken to the
Supreme Court. (Taylor v. Briggs, et al., No. 12937).
No doubt the decision in this case will clarify the con-
troversial question discussed in this article.
BAR POLL UPON PROHIBITION
At a meeting of the Denver Bar Association held May 2,
1932, the following resolution was adopted:
BE IT RESOLVED by The Denver Bar Association that a written
poll of the membership be forthwith taken to determine the sentiment of the
Association upon the following alternatives:
1. For continuance and enforcement of the existing prohibition laws.
2. For repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment and laws passed in
pursuance thereof.
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0 TAMMANY! 0 MORES!
Andrew W. Gillette, Esq., relays to the editors a clipping from the pious
New York Times of March 10, current annum. It relates to the trial of one
James Farley, late Sheriff. Whether the Times or the judge or both are
accountable for the spelling, the law we must assume is the judge's. We
quote: "Farley's defense was that he believed he was entitled to the interest
money he received (on deposits of litigants' funds in his hands) . . . and
that he had been so advised by his chief counsel ...Judge Freschi expressed
the belief (in the course of an opinion turning Brother Farley loose on a
directed verdict) that this advice was not in accordance with the law." Said
Judge Freschi: " 'The gist of the offense is the presence of a specific criminal
intent on the part of the defendant. Intent is largely a matter of one's mind
and volition. It is predicated on knowledge of the facts. . . . Intent is the
ingredient of the crime of grand larceny. Every appropriation of money is
not a theft, and, yet, every theft involves a misappropriation of ananimus
furandi. Where the act is susceptible of two constructions-one innocent,
one guilty-the law makes it imperative that the hypothesis shall be accepted
which establishes innocence. The conduct of the defendant here has been
consistent with innocence ... ' "
IN OTHER WORDS, DON'T CHANGE TOBOGGANS
IN THE MIDDLE OF THE SLIDE
Rep. Hoover (Rep.) of Michigan has a few words to say which are
faithfully reproduced by the Congressional Record:
"The stove league never wins any pennants. The Democratic street-
corner brand of statesmanship never solves any problems. For 70 years the
Democratic party has done nothing but denounce the policies of the Republican
party. It has become a Democratic tradition. It has passed from generation
to generation. The son has plied the trade of the father. It has become
habitual. It is in the blood. You cannot change it. You cannot expect a
wrecking crew to do the work of an engineering corps."
LAST MONTH'S (OR ANY MONTH'S) WORST PUN
Lee Taylor Casey, on purpose to make it worse, parades the following
in his column of April 16 last:
"In reality,, the dog breeder usurps the functions of Providence. ...
Instead of permitting mutual attraction or propinquity to be the mediums
of propagating the race, he makes the choice dogmatically. . ....
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THE WORM TURNS
A. L. Vogl, Esq., our Public Utilities Commission reporter, 'phoned
this jewel in to one of our rewrite men. It occurred before the Commission
aforesaid on April 12:
Commissioner: We will now adjourn until 2:20 P. M.
Witness: Mr. Commissioner, I would like to catch the 3:20 train for
Kansas City.
Commissioner: I don't know whether counsel can conclude his cross-
examination in that time.
Witness: Mr. Commissioner, I'll waive further cross-examination.
WE WISH FORD HAD NEVER BEEN BORN-
YOU WILL IN A MINUTE
Albert J. Gould, Jr., Esq. (President Gould to you), unearths some
ghastly judicial witicisms in Bank v. Pulliam, 239 Pac. 595:
Ruth, C: ". . . The legislature has seen fit to legislate upon the ques-
tion of exemption of automobiles (including Ford cars by necessary implica-
tion), and by an act of the legislature it is specifically provided that 'automo-
biles and other motor vehicles shall not be exempt from attachment, execution
and other forced sale.' It is not contended that a Ford car is a 'tool,' and
we have never heard it called a 'tool,' although we confess to having heard it
called everything else within the range of the English language, and several
foreign languages. If exemptions could ever have been claimed for it under
section 6595, and prior to the act of 1913, it would have to fall within the
term 'apparatus,' and all lexicographers -define apparatus as 'an outfit of tools,
utensils or instruments adopted to the accomplishment of any branch of work,
or for the performance of an experiment, or operation; a set of such appli-
ances; a group or set of organs concerned in the performance of a single func-
tion.' While a Ford car may emit as great a volume of sound as a steam
piano or circus calliope, we are not prepared to say it is a set of organs, and
therefore not within the protection of the statute ... "
SLEEP, LITTLE MORTGAGE: BE AT PEACE
Allen Moore, Esq., fastened his eye on a harsh ruling of the Supreme
Court of Illinois, to be found in Palmer v. Forbes, 23 Ill. 301, 311, as
follows:
"Caton, Q. J.: Railroad mortgages, like all other contracts, must be
enforced according to the intention of the parties to them, and conformable
to the law under which they were issued. We cannot make or mollify these
any more than any other contracts, or the law by which they shall be governed
and enforced."
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IN LAW, IT IS FRAUDULENT TO THE MORAL*
Robert E. More, Esq., apparently reads the Harvard Law Review; at
least, in any event, or in the last analysis, he calls our attention to 45 H. L. R.
131, where it is pointed out that "a debtor is guilty of making a fraudulent
preference if he makes a payment of a mere moral obligation."
*Syllabus by Mr. More.
THIS SOUNDS FAMILIAR
From Lange v. Dammier, 119 Ind. 567: "Having given the question
some considerable consideration as we find it in the record, and without inti-
mating any opinion as to the result of our investigation, we have thought it
not improper to say what we have said."
A NEVADA JURIST WAXETH ELOQUENT
Sonorous, but somewhat immodest, expression of Brosnan, J., as reported
in Rhodes v. O'Farrell, 2 Nev. 60:
"If the state will disrobe herself of sovereignty and enter the forensic
arena with her subject", etc.
ANOTHER CRIMINAL BEATS THE RAP
"A rule of law fit only to try the guilty is no better than lynch law."-
State v. Powell, 266 Mo. 109.
PLEADING AFTER OUR OWN HEART
"A bad answer is good enough for a bad complaint."-Baxter v. Mc-
Donnell, 154 N. Y. 432.
NOTICE I
At a meeting of the Judges of the District Court held
April 12th, a Resolution was passed,
"That there be no jury in the Civil Divisions of the
District Court in the month of June, 1932, and that there
be only one jury in September, same to be called for the
third Tuesday."
It is expected that the September Jury will be called in
the new Court House.
F. D. STACKHOUSE,
Clerk, District Court.
. . Trial Court Decisions..
City and County of Denver v Sronce. In Denver County Court before Judge
Luxford. No. 74715.
Defendant was arrested in one of the "Mountain Parks" owned by
the City of Denver and outside of its corporate limits, for reckless driving
in violation of an ordinance of the City of Denver expressly applicable to the
Mountain Parks. The arrest was made by police officers of the City of
Denver.
For such violation a fine was imposed on defendant by the Denver
Municipal Court, from which judgment defendant appealed to the County
Court. Admitting the power of the City to own territory outside of its
corporate limits, defendant contended that this does not give the City any
police jurisdiction over such territory and that the City has no power to
regulate traffic on the roads in such territory and the Municipal Court no
jurisdiction to fine persons for violation of such regulations. Defendant con-
tended that such police powers were in this case vested solely in the authorities
of Jefferson County.
Held: That the City of Denver has authority to make regulations for
the traffic in such territory, and to employ officers to enforce the same, and
that its Municipal Court has jurisdiction to impose fines for the violation
of such regulations. Judgment affirmed.
A4mick vs. Amick. In the District Court for the City and County of Denver.
Before Judge Calvert, No. 63359.
In 1918 the wife secured a divorce from the husband in a non-contested
case. The parties reached an agreement out of court as to the financial settle-
ment; and in pursuance of this agreement, the defendant paid plaintiff
$3,000.00 before the entering of the final decree.
The final decree of divorce entered on motion of plaintiff's attorney
provided that the parties had agreed upon the amount of money to be paid
plaintiff and the manner of its payment to plaintiff, which was to be in full
settlement, and that defendant had fully complied with the terms of that
agreement as had been set forth in the Court's findings of fact and con-
clusions of law, and the decree provided that the defendant was "forever
discharged and released from any and all liability, claims, or demands of
whatsoever kind or character, which the said plaintiff may have against the
defendant, his heirs or assigns, with regard to any or all of his property, real,
personal or mixed, rights or hereditaments, and shall be relieved from pay-
ment of any and all alimony."
In July, 1931, plaintiff filed her petition to re-open the case, vacate the
decree and award the plaintiff additional alimony, the petition setting forth
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that the plaintiff was poor and that the defendant was now living in affluence
and that the settlement had been secured through misrepresentation of de-
fendant as to the worth of his business. Defendant demurred to the petition.
Held: On account of the decree entered in 1918, the matter is res
judicata. The Court has no power to re-open the case or vacate the decree.
The only cases doing so are those involving decrees providing for future
payments of alimony or cases where children are involved. Demurrer over-
ruled.
Jewell vs. Jewell, 71 Colo. 470, distinguished on the ground that the
life estate originally given in full settlement of alimony in that case was in
effect alimony to be paid in future installments, it being a life estate in income
property.
While the Court had the demurrer under advisement, it heard the
evidence in the case. The Court also found for the defendant on the facts.
POSTOFFICE DEPARTMENT BATS 1001%
A letter addressed to a Denver attorney at "2021 Extri-
cable Building" was duly delivered to the addressee at his
office in the University Building.
Justice is the set and constant purpose which gives to every man his due.
The precepts of law are these: To live honorably, to injure no one, and to
give every man his due.-Justinian.
Right is therefore the sum of the conditions under which the will of
one can be brought into harmony with the will of another according to a
universal law of freedom. Every act is right which, in itself, or in accordance
with its maxim, can co-exist with the freedom of the will of each and all
according to a universal law.-Kant.
(EDiToR's NOTE.-It is intended to print brief abstracts of the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the issue of Dicta next appearing after the rendition thereof. In the
event of the filing of a petition for rehearing, resulting in any change or modification
of opinion, such will be indicated in later digests.)
Quo WARRANTO--LIBRARY BoARD--RIGHT TO HOLD OFFICE--People vs.
Shaffer-No. 12998-Decided March 14, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice
Burke.
1. Under Colorado Statute, a Library Board consists of the Mayor
and six members, the offices of three expiring each year, and the vacancies to
be filled by remaining members, and when at an election, the Mayor and one
member of Board vote for two old members and two other members of Board
vote for three other candidates, two remaining members not voting, there was
a tie, and all candidates so elected were without title to the office.
2. The Mayor, being a member of the board, was entitled to vote.
3. The members of Library Board, whose terms expired, did not hold
over under Section 1 Article XII of our Constitution.-J.dgment affirmed.
DIVORCE - EXTREME CRUELTY - SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE - Miller vs.
Miller-No. 12635-Decided March 14, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice
Burke.
1. Evidence that husband beat wife until she was black and blue; that
he wanted to fight, cursed her, called her names; that h;s threats of violence
continued for three years, is sufficient to sustain a decree of divorce.
2. Such conduct establishes extreme and repeated acts of cruelty.
3. Such cruelty may be inflicted by words alone.
4. Plaintiff's explicit statement as to the results of such acts, not
essential to support finding to that effect.-Judgment affirmed.
ATTORNEYS AT LAw-DIBARMENT-REPRIMANi---People vs. Blank-No.
13070-Decided March 21, 1932-Opinion by Mr- Justice Burke.
1. Where an attorney is a deputy district attorney and shares expense
of a stenographer with another.attorney engaged in civil practice only, and
has stenographer sign claims for salary in blank, and then fills in blank for
full amount of salary, approves them in his official capacity, adds verification
and files with county and collects warrants issued therefor and deposits same
to his own account, he is guilty of unprofessional conduct.
2. Where an attorney is a deputy district attorney and as such files
criminal complaint against one of the parties and accepts employment from
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the other party to collect damages from party against whom the criminal
complaint was filed, he is guilty of unprofessional conduct.
3. If a prosecutor has a private interest in a criminal case under his
jurisdiction, it bars him from proceeding as such prosecutor.
4. He cannot act even by consent of the parties.
5. Under such facts, the recommendation of the Grievance Committee
of the Bar Association that such attorney be merely reprimanded is too lenient.
6. However, in view of his former unblemished record and the further
fact that the recommendation of such Committee should be given the same
effect as the presumption indulged in in favor of the action of a trial court or
jury who have tried the case and had the opportunity of seeing and hearing
the witnesses, the recommendation will be accepted.
Reprimand administered by the Court.
TRUSTS-RESULTING--INSUFFIENCY OF EVIDENCE-DEFECTIVE ABSTRACT
-Ehrenkrook vs. Ehrenkrook-No. 12605-Decided March 21, 1932-
Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
1. Evidence examined and held to be insufficient to establish a result-
ing trust.
2. Where important facts are omitted from the abstract and are
supplied by a supplemental abstract furnished by defendant in error, the
cost thereof will be taxed to plaintiff in error.
3. Where the trial court's findings that no resulting trust existed in
the real estate is supported by such a mass of damning facts as exist in this
case, the most indefatigable legal research and keenest judicial vision could
not discover any legal rights in favor of plaintiff in error.-Judgment affirmed.
ATTORNEYS AT LAw-DISBARMENT-READMISSION ON PROBATION-People
vs. Hillyer-No. 12548-Decided March 21, 1932-Per curiam.
1. Where an attorney has been disbarred, and a petition is filed for
reinstatement and Committee on Grievances of the Colorado Bar Association
after investigation, recommends that attorney be reinstated on condition for
a period of one year, on probation, the Supreme Court will follow such
recommendation.
2. Judgment of disbarment suspended and respondent is permitted
to resume and exercise his office as an attorney at law until the further order
of the court in the premises.
Campbell, J. not participating.
CONTRACTS-CONSTRUCTION-AGREEMENT TO INDEMNIFY OR MERELY DE-
FEND ACTION-MOTION TO STRIKE-Hall v. Cannon-No. 12643-De-
cided March 28, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
1. Where plaintiff takes possession of an automobile, as mortgagee,
and defendant, contending that mortgage is void, and that he is about to sue
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out an attachment, enters into an agreement with plaintiff that he will forego
the attachment by plaintiff transferring equity in car to defendant and de-
fendant agrees that he "will further defend plaintiff against any and all suits
or actions which may be brought against him," such contract is not a contract
of indemnification.
2. Such contract is performed by defendant's furnishing attorneys and
paying costs of such defense.
3. Where plaintiff accepted the services of the attorneys furnished by
defendant, without objection, he cannot hold defendant liable for any alleged
negligence of the attorneys in handling the defense, and it was proper to
strike such allegation from the complaint.-Judgment affirmed.
CORPORATIONS-NEGLIGENCE-PRIMA FACIE CASE-NoN SUIT-Blankette
v. Public Service Company of Colorado-No. 12587-Decided March 28,
1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
1. It is error to grant motion for non-suit where plaintiff has made a
prima facie case.
2. Where defendant was a public service corporation furnishing elec-
tricity, it was its duty to exercise the highest degree of care that skill and
foresight can attain, consistent with the practical conduct of the business
under known methods and the present state of the business.
3. This rule applies to the maintenance and inspection of its entire
plant, including its poles and its transmission and service wires.
4. Plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of negligence of defendant
by circumstantial evidence. -Judgment reversed.
DAMAGES-EXEMPLARY-POWER OF COURT TO AWARD IN ABSENCE OF
JURY-SURFACE RIGHTS ON PLACER CLAIM-Calvat v. Franklin-No.
12526-Decided March 28, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Campbell.
1. Where the locater of a placer claim has received final receipt from
United States therefor and leases the surface for pasturing sheep, the lessee
can maintain trespass against a stranger who destroys the pasturage thereon.
2. In such case, where actual and exemplary damages are claimed and
both parties waive a jury and try cause to the Court, the judge has power to
award exemplary damages.-Judgment affirmed.
DEEDs-BREACH OF COVENANT-INSTALLMENT TAXES FOR SPECIAL IM-
PROVEMENTs-LIABILITY-Wilson v. Barney-No. 12607-Decided March
28, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
1. Where a deed contains a covenant that the real estate is free and
clear from all taxes and assessments levied since April 15, 1925, and it appears
that at date of deed, there were existing and future installments of special
improvement taxes against the real estate which had been levied prior thereto,
there was a breach of covenant, for which the grantor was liable in damages.
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2. The assessments, although due in the future, were a charge on the
real estate at the date of the deed.
3. In case of any conflict between provisions in a contract to convey
and a deed executed in compliance therewith, the deed, being unambiguous and
expressing the final agreement of the parties, controls.
4. The Court erred in sustaining a demurrer to the complaint for
want of facts.-Judgment reversed.
DEEDS-TAx DEEDS-VOID ON FACE-EFFECT-NoN SuIT-Hochmuth v.
Norton-No. 12679-Decided March 28, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice
Burke.
1. Where, in an action in ejectment, plaintiff relies on fee title and
defendant claims title under a tax deed, and tax deed is not offered, but
plaintiff offers abstract which shows that tax deed was issued pursuant to a
sale held November 30, 1915, where under the statute the sale should have
been held on November 8, 1915, and there was no record of its being an
adjourned sale, such tax deed is void on its face.
2. The five-year statute of limitations has no application to a tax deed
void on its face.
3. The trial court erred in granting a non suit on ground that plain-
tiff's title was extinguished by defendant's tax deed.-Judgment reversed.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-RIGHT OF CREDITOR TO ADMINISTRA-
TION-Estate of Webb v. Jack-No. 13009-Decided March 28, 1932-
Opinion by Mr. Justice Alter.
1. Where a person dies intestate, leaving no surviving wife or known
heirs, a creditor has a' preferential right over a stranger to be appointed
administrator.
2. In such case, the County Judge has no discretion to appoint any one
except such creditor, being otherwise qualified.
3. While our statute (Sec. 5222 C. L. 1921) employs the words "the
County Court may grant administration to any creditor who shall apply for
same," the word "may" means "shall" or "must."-Judgment reversed.
FRAUD-CoNSPIRACY-PROOF OF-Ellis vs. The Colorado National Bank-
No. 12824-Decided April 4, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
1. Allegations that the Colorado National Bank and others conspired
with Mrs. Ellis, who had illegally procured the property and business of her
insane husband, in the drawing of a will, creating a trust estate and that the
bank acted as executor after her death and as testamentary trustee and dis-
posed of some of the property for merely nominal consideration and ousted
the plaintiff and that these acts were done with knowledge that the plaintiff
was insane, were not sustained by the evidence.-Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Burke dissents.
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MANDAMUS-MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT-
REMOVAL OF PUMPS FROM SIDE-WALKS-People, ex. rel. Stonebraker vs.
Wood-No. 13060-Decided April 4, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice
Burke.
1. In a complaint for mandamus against a city and its officers to com-
pel the removal of 30 gasoline pumps unlawfully in the city streets and side-
walks, where the plaintiff is a private person, he has capacity to sue.
2. Private persons may move for mandamus to enforce a public duty
not due to the government as such, without the intervention of the govern-
ment law officer.
3. In such case it was not necessary to join the several owners or
operators of the pumps. The defendant city and its officers were necessary
parties defendant but while the owners or operators of the pumps would be
proper parties, they were not necessary parties. The object of the action was
to compel the city to do its duty in removing obstructions on the sidewalks
and in the streets.
4. There was no misjoinder of causes of action. This is a single suit
against the city only to enforce a specific legal duty.
5. The demurrer to the complaint should have been overruled.-
Judgment reversed.
DEEDS-WHEN CONSTRUED AS MORTGAGES-BURDEN OF PROOF-Oppegard
vs. Oppegard-No. 12571-Decided April 4, 1932-Opinion by Mr.
Justice Butler.
1. A deed purporting to be an absolute conveyance may be proven
by parol evidence to be, in fact, a mortgage but to have that effect, the evi-
dence must be clear, certain and unequivocal and must be convincing beyond
a reasonable doubt.
2. Where the evidence is conflicting, the decree of the court below
finding the evidence insufficient to declare the deed to be a mortgage will not
be disturbed.
3. The burden of proof rested upon the plaintiff and the evidence
relied on by him to establish his case does not meet the requirements of the
law.-Judgment affirmed.
FATHER'S RIGHT TO CUSTODY OF CHILD-BILL OF EXCEPTIONS-VACATION
OF ORDER ENTERED IMPROVIDENTLY-Lowe vs. Ruh, et al.-No. 12556-
Decided April 4, 1932-En Ban c-Mr. Justice Moore not participating-
Opinion by Mr. Justice Campbell.
1. When the mother has been awarded the custody of a child and the
father has removed to another state and has failed for many years to pay
alimony to the mother and support money for the child, and the father, shortly
after the mother's death, returns to Colorado and obtains an order for the
custody of the child, without notice, in the first instance, to the grandparents,
in whose care the child has been placed, it was proper for the district court,
at a later hearing, to vacate the original order giving the custody to the father.
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2. Where there is no bill of exceptions the decision of the Supreme
Court must be based on matters contained in record proper.
3. The validity of adoption proceedings instituted by the child's grand-
parents, without notice to the father, is commented upon but not held necessary
to the decision of this case.-Judgment affirmed.
NEGLIGENCE-EVIDENCE DIRECTED VERDICT-Denver Tramway Corpora-
tion vs. Wells-No. 12402-Decided April 4, 1932-En Banc-Mr.
Justice Moore not participating-Opinion by Mr. Justice Alter.
1. Negligence is never presumed but must be proven by the preponder-
ance of the evidence by the one alleging it.
2. The evidence showed that a street car operated by the defendant
below was going east on Larimer Street; that it stopped to take on passengers;
that the motorman rang his gong, made the proper signal, and threw the elec-
tric switch so that the car turned to the left. The plaintiff testified that she
did not hear any gong rung, or see the motorman make any signal; that she
saw the street car only twice; the first time when she was going west on
Larimer Street at some distance from the corner, and the second time when
she saw the street car's headlight flash in her face, after which she became
unconscious. Under this evidence the injury to the plaintiff was solely the
result of the negligence of the driver of the car in which the plaintiff was a
passenger. The plaintiff was not entitled to recover damages.-Judgment
reversed with instructions.
Mr. Justice Butler and Mr. Justice Hilliard dissent.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-SUPPLEMENTAL AWARD--NECESSITY FOR
FINDINGS OF FACT BY INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION-Hayden Brothers Coal
Corporation, et al, vs. Industrial Commission of Colorado, et al-No.
13025-Decided April 4, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Alter.
1. When the Industrial Commission makes an award of compensation,
and thereafter makes a supplemental award, it is the duty of the Commission
to make sufficiently detailed findings of fact so that the courts can determine
whether the order or award is supported by the facts. In the absence of such
findings of fact such a supplemental award cannot be sustained.-Judgment
reversed with directions.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-SUPPLEMENTAL AWARD-NECESSITY FOR
FINDINGS OF FACT BY INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION-North Park Coal Com-
pany, et al, vs. Industrial Commission of Colorado, et al.-No. 13010-
Decided April 4, 1932 -Opinion by Mr. Justice Alter.
1. The holding in this case is similar to that of No. 13025 above.
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FIRE INSURANCE-HOSTILE FIRE-PLEADING PERFORMANCE AND PROVING
WAIVER-Fire Association of Philadelphia vs. Nelson-No. 12603-De-
cided April 11, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Campbell.
1. Where fire is employed as an agent, the insurer is not liable for the
consequences thereof, so long as the fire itself is confined within the limit of
the agencies employed, as from the effects of smoke or heat evolved thereby.
2. The insurer is liable where there is an actual ignition outside of the
agencies employed, not purposely caused by the insured, and damage ensues
from the smoke and heat caused by the fire dehors the agencies.
3. Where insured alleges performance on his part. all conditions pre-
cedent to recovery, he can prove waiver by the insurer of such conditions or
requirements of the policy.-Judgment affirmed.
FRAUD-MISREPRESENTATIONS-SETTING UP IN COUNTER-CLAIM TO FORE-
CLOSURE SUIT-BURDEN OF PRooF-Catrow vs. Kinghorn-No. 13062-
Decided 4pril 11, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
1. In an action to foreclosure a mortgage on a gasoline filling station,
where the defendant files counter-claim for recision and damages because of
misrepresentations and failure of consideration, the burden of proof of estab-
lishing same rests upon the defendant.
2. Where the defendant alleged that the misrepresentations were made
to him by agent of seller, but proof shows that before closing the deal for the
purchase, defendant discussed all these matters with plaintiff, it cannot be said
that the defendant relied upon the representations of the agent. However,
this was a question of fact to be determined by the Court.
3. Where part of the representations were that the business had earned
a certain net income over a period of time and the evidence was in dispute,
this was a question of fact for the Court.
4. Where part of the representations were that the investment was
safe, sound and profitable and the trial court found that the defendant made
his own investigation and reached his own conclusion in regard thereto, such
was based on conclusions properly deducible from the disputed evidence.-
Judgment affirmed.
NOTICE!
Lawyer in County seat town in Colorado, with good steady practice and little
competition, desires to be away for two years for health, and will accept
partner on liberal terms. Experience in work of County Attorney and
Municipal Attorney, good character, ability and $1500.00 cash required. This
is an excellent opportunity for right man desiring an opening. Address all
communications do DICTA, 728 Gas & Electric Bldg., Denver, Colo.
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PHOTOSTAT COPIES
INSTANT SERVICE! WE CALL FOR AND DELIVER YOUR WORK
ALL WORK STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
DRAWINGS - BLUE PRINTS - RECORD BOOK PAGES - LETTERS
LEGAL EXHIBITS
Commercial Copying Compamy
Keystone 2448 1438 Tremont Place Denver
Before writing a commumication of importace,
male sure that it will commad the attention
it deserves, rghlt from tle start, by selecting
with care the stationery whicil carries it. It
slaoulJ be engraved..... . .*. .* .. .. .. °.'...
1836 CHAMPA MAIN 5161
I I
When you jump out of bed for a hurry-up morning,
with face taut and nerves on edge from lack of sleep-
that's no time to have the HOT faucet run COLD,
encouraging the razor to nick and slice as you shave.
But when you turn on the good old HOT water, work
up a quick creamy lather for a shave as smooth as silk,
top off with more HOT water and a towel, then ALL'S
WELL WITH THE WORLD.
Install an AUTOMATIC GAS WATER HEATER
today and have hot water ALWAYS, when you want itI
Public Service Company of Colorado





Trustee under Corporate Mortgages . . . Deposi-
tary for Protective Committees ... Transfer Agent
and Registrar for Corporate Stocks . . . Miscel-
laneous Fiscal Agencies.
Serl1ices to Indibiduals and Families
Executor and Administrator of Estates... Trus-
tee under Wills... Trustee of Living Trusts and
Life Insurance Trusts.. Safe-keeping of Securities.
0
Escrows
BUSINESS SERVICE FOR BUSINESS MEN
AND WOMEN AND THEIR COUNSEL.
0
THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL BANK
THE AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK
THE DENVER NATIONAL BANK
THE COLORADO NATIONAL BANK
THE INTERNATIONAL TRUST COMPANY
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